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 INCENTIVE EFFECTS FROM DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
TO HOLDUP MITIGATION SURROUNDING PATENT 
REMEDIES AND STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
F. Scott Kieff* & Anne Layne-Farrar† 
 
ABSTRACT 
Debates about patent policy often focus on the potential for the threat of a court-imposed remedy 
for patent infringement to cause manufacturing entities and others to suffer patent holdup, 
especially when standardized industries are involved. This article uses lessons from the broader 
economics and political science literatures on holdup to explore various approaches to setting 
remedies for patent infringement—namely injunctions and money damages in the form of lost 
profits or reasonable royalties—with an eye towards the nature and extent of various forms of 
holdup they each might generate. In so doing, the article contrasts various narrower sub-categories 
of the broad holdup problem, including patent holdup, reverse patent holdup, and government 
holdup. The article elucidates a number of existing legal institutions and organizations that 
significantly mitigate the threat of patent holdup, including particular doctrines in the law of patent 
remedies and particular private ordering arrangements such as Standard Setting Organizations 
(SSOs). It also highlights some of the unfortunate unintended consequences of currently popular 
suggestions for mitigating patent holdup. It then explores the economic incentives driving the 
actions by both patent holder and licensee to show different categories of holdup risk they create. It 
closes by introducing a suggested framework for courts and administrative agencies to use to 
directly target the identified categories of holdup risk, and thereby limit harmful side effects.  
 
JEL: A12, B25, D23, D45, K4, K11, K20, L41, L44, O31, O33, O34  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
This article offers a comparative institutional analysis of different approaches to one of today’s hot 
topics in patent law: the ways in which various approaches to setting remedies for patent 
infringement—namely injunctions, ordinary damages in the form of lost profits or reasonable 
royalties, and enhanced damages including attorney fees and multipliers of ordinary damages—
may affect the incentives of various participants in the marketplace surrounding patents in ways 
that increase the risk of various types of holdup to varying degrees. In so doing, it builds on the 
literature that compares the type of holdup that occurs in the marketplace by private actors 
asserting property rights (of which patent holdup has become one infamous example) with the 
type of holdup that occurs by and through government actors implementing the sorts of court and 	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agency reviews suggested by most of the recent high-profile court decisions and agency actions in 
the field of patents.1  
In keeping with the diverse uses in the literature of the term holdup, this article uses that term 
to refer to a broad category of phenomena, which includes various narrower sub-categories such as 
patent holdup, reverse patent holdup, and government holdup.2 While the popular perspective, 
reflected in most of the recent academic literature and nearly all of the recent high-profile 
government actions in the field of patents, focuses almost entirely on avoiding the risk of only 
patent holdup—one of several sub-categories—this article adopts a comparative institutional 
approach that considers how different legal rules affect incentives in ways that impact the risks of 
each of these three sub-categories.  
For example, the Federal Trade Commission recently issued an extensive report focusing on 
the purported patent holdup problem in the particular area of patent remedies relating to the 
standard setting organizations,3 and Judge Richard Posner sitting by designation as a trial judge 
recently issued with much fanfare a decision to dismiss the Apple v. Motorola case before trial 
because he found that neither side had shown it had suffered any actual harm.4 He then blogged 
about the “dysfunctional patent system”5 in the U.S. and published a piece in The Atlantic6 
complaining about a host of purported problems in the patent system that the FTC Report and 
many in the academic literature generally attribute to patent holdup. As detailed by the FTC and 
others, the crux of the purported patent holdup problem is the effort by patentees to extort too high 
of a licensing price against the threat of suing a manufacturer of a technology after the 
manufacturer has sunk the cost of various investments, like building a factory or designing 
complementary components.7 The problem is said to be exacerbated by the prevalence of “low 
quality” patents: manufacturers see too many of the asserted patents to be worth far less, if not 
entirely worthless, than claimed by the patentee, usually because non-infringing technologies are 
economic substitutes or the legal requirements for a valid patent were not met.8  
This article offers a contrasting view to the one sketched above. While the problems that 
holdup can create are clear, it is also clear that such problems can emerge from many different 
quarters and in many different contexts, far beyond the relatively narrow context of patent holders 
exploiting manufacturers, either within or without the standard-setting context. This article takes a 
broader view to highlight the need for a carefully balanced approach to finding solutions to the 
risk of holdup in the context of patents and standard-setting. It points out the broader reach of the 
holdup problem in economics, of which patent holdup is just one narrow example, to elucidate the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See generally Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up 
Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 19 (2012) (collecting sources); Anne Layne-Farrar, 
Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge Padilla, Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard-Setting 
Efforts, J. ECON. & MGT. STRATEGY (forthcoming 2013). 
2 For more on the sub-categories reverse patent holdup and government holdup, see discussions infra, note 18 and Part 
IV.B (on reverse patent holdup, also called “holdout” and “licensee holdup”), and notes 22-26 and accompanying text (on 
government holdup).  
3 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 
28, 234-35 (2011) [hereinafter “FTC Report”]. 
4 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012).  
5 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Capitalism-Posner, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (June 3, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com; Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restriction Competition and Creativity Excessively? Posner, 
THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com.  
6 Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC, July 12, 2012. But see Richard A. 
Epstein, Richard Posner Gets It Wrong, DEFINING IDEAS, July 31, 2012.  
7 See, e.g., FTC Report, supra note 3, at 191 n.61 (focusing on sunk costs of the infringer).  
8 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Reply: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2163 (2007) (arguing 
that the holdup problem for patents is due to two factors: the large number of patent claims determined to be invalid or 
non-infringed and the ability for patent infringement remedies to impact non-infringing components of products 
adjudicated to have infringing components). 
nature and function of the risk and various approaches to lessen that risk. In so doing, the article 
helps targeting the precise mechanisms by which different types of holdup are thought to occur, 
thereby endeavoring to directly mitigate the problems raised by patent critics while minimizing 
unintended consequences that would undermine the core goals of the patent system: encouraging 
risky investments in innovation and its commercialization so as to facilitate coordination among 
all commercial actors and thereby increase competition and access to patented technologies.  
The article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly reviews the well-studied ways in which the 
broadly defined problem of holdup has been shown throughout extensive practical experience and 
academic study to have a negative impact, and the ways in which various tools and techniques 
have been used to mitigate this pernicious effect. Along the way, Part II explores some of the ways 
in which the broad category of holdup is sometimes observed from the perspective of particular 
individuals within an economic interaction, who may perceive the other side of holdup’s 
inherently symmetrical nature. The same interaction between counter parties to an economic 
exchange may be seen by one as posing the risk of holdup and the other as posing the risk of 
reverse holdup. In addition, whichever party is better able to wield the political influence needed 
to invoke particular government action may generate a third sub-category of holdup that can be 
seen as government holdup. Part III reviews the many dimensions of the patent system that do not 
relate to the rules for court-imposed remedies for infringement and that go a long way towards 
mitigating several important risks of patent holdup. Part IV outlines the main features of patent 
remedies under existing law and explores the different key categories of residual risks of patent 
holdup they do raise, with particular focus on the standard setting context. As part of that analysis, 
Part IV points out the ways in which contrasting forms of holdup risk can emerge, including, for 
example, reverse patent holdup. Part V outlines the contrast between the popular suggestions for 
new rules or regulations to curb patent holdup and our suggested approach towards a framework 
for mitigating each of the key categories of holdup risks. In so doing, it highlights the ways in 
which these different approaches interact with the core mechanisms through which each category 
of holdup is likely to occur. Part VI concludes, pointing out that if our societal goals are to 
decrease the overall extent of the various forms of holdup risk in markets over patented 
technologies, increase the overall rate of invention and its commercialization, and increase overall 
competition as reflected in diversity in firm size and business models among participants in the 
markets for commercializing innovation, then society should consider moving in a different 




II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HOLDUP AND ITS MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
 
The problem of holdup is well studied in the economic history literature and generally refers to the 
problem that arises out of the interaction between asset specificity and opportunism. Nobel Prize-
sharing economist Oliver Williamson has long studied transactions and offers a widely accepted 
definition of these terms. He explains that asset specificity refers to the condition in which an asset 
cannot be redeployed from its presently intended use to some alternative use without a decline in 
value.9 Imagine finding yourself under the hot sun of the tropics holding a large quantity of some 
rapidly rotting agricultural produce like bananas or sugar cane, suddenly sad to learn that your best 
laid plans to sell at the relatively high cash price for fresh harvest are at increasing risk. You 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 52–56 (Free Press 1985) (reviewing literature 
and explaining that “[a]t least four different types of asset specificity are usefully distinguished: site specificity; physical 
asset specificity; human asset specificity; and dedicated assets . . . [and that t]he importance of asset specificity to 
transaction cost economics is difficult to exaggerate”). 
would have to quickly develop alternative plans for this harvest, like a last-minute rush to find and 
close a deal with purveyors of compost or manufacturers of distilled spirits already operating, or 
purporting to operate, at their comfortable capacity and therefore only willing to pay a 
significantly reduced price for your produce. In this story, the harvested crop in the hands of its 
seller faces an asset specificity problem because it is specifically adapted for the initial plan in a 
way that leaves the available alternative plans able to recoup only some lower value. Williamson 
further explains that times like this are unfortunately when opportunism can take hold; where he 
defines opportunism as “[s]elf-interest seeking with guile, [including] calculated efforts to 
mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise confuse.”10 Returning to our tropical story, this would 
mean that the initial or subsequent buyers misleadingly proclaim an inability to buy the produce 
hoping secretly to settle on a lower price: “I can’t pay full price because my banana shelves 
collapsed and I can’t rebuild them fast enough without using the cash I now have on hand,” while 
knowing a cheap and easy repair will be sufficient; or “my rum factory has one extra but older 
machine that costs far more to operate,” while knowing the newer machines have excess capacity 
available at lower cost. Although little actual harm may come from either party having merely its 
side of the holdup problem, asset specificity on the one hand and opportunism on the other, the 
confluence of the two is what causes the serious problem of holdup. That is, the key to 
Williamson’s well-accepted definitions is that the perpetrator is acting badly by misleading, 
obfuscating, and so forth, and the victim is unable to self-protect, having been caught at the last 
minute without attractive available substitutes and unaware of the full and true set of facts.11  
Holdup problems are sufficiently common across human history that a vast literature has been 
devoted to better understanding why these problems have not blocked economic activity altogether 
and how we can avoid them going forward. A brief review of the lessons learned from the 
extensive and diverse literature helps focus the thinking about the way the risk of holdup is most 
likely playing out within the particular context of patent remedies.  
Those studying the boundaries of business firms have explored the ways in which vertical 
integration can bring together, aligned within one enterprise, two or more smaller enterprises that 
might otherwise clash with each other across a holdup problem. In the case of our tropical story 
that would mean, for example, bringing within one business enterprise the harvesting of sugar 
cane and the manufacturing of rum or sugar, or the harvesting of bananas and their shipping to 
grocery stores in the United States.12 In the case of a more recently studied controversy, it might 
mean bringing the Fisher Body business of making car parts like body panels within the General 
Motors business of making entire cars.13  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 378 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) [hereinafter MECHANISMS 
OF GOVERNANCE]; see also Williamson, supra note 9, at 47–52, 64–67 (detailing different forms of opportunism). 
11 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 1, at 16.  
12 Stephen H. Haber & Victor A. Menaldo, Rainfall, Human Capital, and Democracy 21 (2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1667332 (citing as classic cases bananas (STACY MAY & GALO PLAZA, THE UNITED FRUIT 
COMPANY IN LATIN AMERICA (National Planning Association 1958)) and sugar (Hans Binswanger & Mark Rosenzweig, 
Behavioral and Material Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture, 22 J. DEV. STUD. 503–39 (1986); ALAN 
DYE, CUBAN SUGAR IN THE AGE OF MASS PRODUCTION: TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE SUGAR CENTRAL, 
1899–1929 (Stanford Univ. Press 1998))).  
13 While the GM-Fisher Body story is often cited as the canonical example of vertical integration needed to avoid holdup, 
that view of the story has been proven to be factually inaccurate. See Ronald Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The 
Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 255 (2006). See also Ramon Casadesus-
Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000). Holdup may even have been 
exacerbated by the integration of these two firms. As explained by Freeland, 
 
[t]he GM-Fisher case is . . . the most widely cited example of vertical integration reducing problems of physical 
and human asset specificity, and it serves as an empirical cornerstone for hold-up explanations of unified 
ownership . . . . [But] while holdup was not an issue prior to integration, the Fisher brothers successfully held up 
A need to vertically integrate to avoid the holdup associated with certain types of assets has 
been shown by Haber and Menaldo to have social, political, and economic repercussions that may 
be sufficiently significant to determine whether societies walk a path towards democracy or 
autocracy.14 Haber and Menaldo show how moderate rainfall in certain regions of the world has 
allowed for the production of crops that happen to be easily storable and exhibit modest 
economies of scale, which leads to the efficient unit of production being the family farm, which in 
turn incentivizes broad intergenerational investment in human capital that increases the chance of 
democratic political governance.15 A key difference they highlight in the holdup potential of assets 
like bananas and sugar cane on the one hand and grains and legumes on the other hand is the 
asset’s degree of storability, which allows it to be redeployed to other uses or users if particular 
plans are frustrated.16  
While shifts in technology—like the advent of refrigerated shipping in the case of 
bananas17—may decrease the holdup potential for some assets, other assets are inherently less 
likely to trigger holdup risk at the outset because they already have characteristics that preserve 
their value longer, at least long enough to allow the pressure of sharp bargaining by the 
opportunistic to cut less harshly into the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the 
potential holdup victim. For legumes and grains, that characteristic is innate storability, which 
gives each harvester time to find alternative customers and each customer time to find alternative 
sources. 
For patents, the analogous characteristic is the extent to which the term of their legal 
enforceability is likely to extend beyond any particular business or legal spat. If patent owners 
know their patents will remain in force and sustain demand beyond the time it takes to sort out 
interactions with a potential infringer, then at least the patentees are less subject to some forms of 
holdup.18  
Of course, the patent holder represents just one side of the two-sided negotiation. As such, the 
patent holders’ own relief from holdup tells us nothing of its propensity to engage in holdup of its 
own, against potential users of the patented technology—the issue that motivates patent critics. 
And this type of holdup, by patentees against alleged infringers, must not be overlooked because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
GM after they became employees; far from reducing opportunistic behavior, vertical integration increased 
GM’s vulnerability to rent-seeking behavior. 
 
See Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 
(2000).  
14 Haber & Menaldo, supra note 12. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 3 (“[I]t [is], of course, possible to grow food [in the tropics]—but what [can] be [grown either has] very low 
degrees of storability [(e.g. tree crops, such as bananas) or is characterized by extremely large scale economies in 
production (e.g. sugar cane).]”). Indeed, the vertical integration component of the large-scale economies in production of 
sugar cane may itself be caused by the degree of storability and the resulting need to avoid holdup.  
17 Robert A. Read, The Banana Industry: Oligopoly and Barriers to Entry, in 10 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 198 (Routledge 1993). 
18 Patentees may still be subject to other patent holdup risks—sometimes called “reverse patent holdup” or a type of 
“holdout”—within a standard setting organization (SSO), if manufacturers hold themselves out of concluding deals with 
patentees while demanding that these innovators, who have already sunk the costs of inventing and patenting their 
technology for use in a standard, offer low royalty terms as a condition for supporting inclusion of that patented 
technology in the standard. By holding out for unreasonable deal terms, these potential infringers can cause a holdup 
problem in the opposite direction: against the patentees and all those who have invested in the patentee, like other 
licensees. Epstein, Kieff, & Spulber, supra note 1, at 22–23. See also Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet & A. Jorge 
Padilla, Preventing Patent Holdup: An Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 
AIPLA Q. J. 445 (2009) (explaining how a standard setting organization’s [SSO] voting rules can grant licensees 
bargaining power that can lead to holdup of patent holders). Because the party causing this type of holdup is the one 
who is a potential licensee of the patent, this sub-category of holdup might also be called “licensee holdup.”  
avoiding the risk of it has been the stated focus of nearly all of the recent high profile government 
actions in the field of patents.19  
But the general non-patent literature has long taught that holdup problems facing both sides of 
potential transactions are significantly diminished to the extent the laws, rules, and norms 
governing the economic system recognize and enforce property rights in the underlying assets and 
contracts between or among the various interested parties.20 This is because predictable and 
knowable property rights and contracts enable precisely the type of individualized and coordinated 
planning that makes it hard for a potential victim of holdup to end up surprised and unaware. 
Returning to the example of cars, suppliers of body panels and manufacturers of cars use a host of 
planning techniques to avoid holdup, including contracts, cross-investing, and long-term 
relationships.21 As explored in more detail below, in Part 0, the patent system has evolved a host 
of such mitigating doctrines of its own, which already are operating independent of the patent 
remedy doctrines that are current targets for reform debates.  
In addition, the general literature also has long taught that informal interactions like repeat 
play can mitigate holdup risk to a significant degree. Once patentees know they can think long 
term about how their assets may be used, they and their potential customers both have different 
incentives. To the extent each expects to engage the other in repeat play, each has incentives to 
cooperate over the long term. A decision to be opportunistic early on in a business relationship can 
significantly increase the chance others will respond opportunistically in return later in the 
relationship, or can at least reduce the odds that the targets of the opportunistic actions will 
become meaningful business partners, which in turn can drive up the original opportunist’s own 
costs of doing business. Envisioning this chain of events from the start reduces both parties’ 
incentives to act opportunistically in the first instance. Even before directly interacting, incentives 
to cooperate can be enhanced if market participants generally are able to learn of each others’ 
reputations with respect to interaction with third parties.  
Lastly, the general literature also has long taught us to be vigilant about a very different form 
of holdup than the one that can arise when market actors interact with each other: that is the 
problem of government holdup, which can arise when market actors have to interact with the 
government.22 Legal entitlements turn out to be most vulnerable to holdup by government, and 
those most able to influence government, when the entitlements are structured so that their owners 
and users must directly involve government officials and organizations in order to transact over 
the entitlements, such as by license, sale, bundling, division, or even seemingly simple pricing.23  
The more that legal decision-making turns on the flexible discretion of legislators, regulators, 
and judges, the more it will tend to favor the powerful political constituents who have the ability 
to most easily influence these government actors, thereby tending to decrease market 
competition.24 The underlying mechanism to envision is not the exchange of some unseemly bag 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.  
20 When ex ante investments can be contracted over, the holdup problem has been shown to vanish. See Vincent P. 
Crawford, Long-Term Relationships Governed by Short-Term Contracts, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 485 (1988); Drew 
Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships, 51 J. 
ECON. THEORY 1 (1990); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of 
Economic Activity, in PERSPERCTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57 (J. E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).  
21 Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 13.  
22 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 1. 
23 Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in 
Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215 (2008).  
24 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (basic public 
choice explanation about how concentrated benefits lead to particular government actions); Stephen Haber, 
Introduction: The Political Economy of Crony Capitalism, in CRONY CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN 
AMERICA: THEORY AND EVIDENCE xi (Stephen Haber ed., Hoover Inst. Press 2002) (data supporting “crony capitalism” 
theory of regulation).  
of cash or off-books favor. Instead it is the nature of the extensive communications the 
government officials would have with those business interests most able to wield political 
influence. The path is paved with the best of intentions. Every business, large and small, has a 
legitimate interest in communicating with government officials, including First Amendment rights 
to Petition the Government and Fifth Amendment Due Process rights to be heard (to varying 
degrees). And well-intentioned government officials, often more expert in the inner workings of 
governmental bureaucracy than the workings of the marketplace outside government, want their 
official actions to be well informed by the expert business and technological information and 
acumen offered by leaders in the marketplace. But the path takes a pernicious turn when it enters 
territory that gives these officials the ability to make decisions with increased latitude, discretion, 
reliance on subjective factors, and deference, decreasingly burdened by requirements for objective 
facts. Decisions of this type are most vulnerable to favoring those parties best able to wield 
political influence, which tilts the playing field leading to decreased competition.  
Alternative procedures that further insulate officials from influence when wielding enhanced 
discretion unburdened by detailed factual records have their own serious shortcomings. As 
elucidated by Elinor Ostrom, who shared the Nobel Prize with Williamson, government shaping of 
entitlements suffers serious inaccuracies due to officials’ limited knowledge of the particular facts 
on the ground compared to that of the market actors who are more closely involved. 25 
Furthermore, because government officials cannot openly negotiate over their decisions, or 
credibly commit to being bound to stick to any actions they do take, they are more likely to cause 
a type of government holdup that is hard to mitigate without completely exiting the system and 
that is especially susceptible to exacerbation through stacking.26  
In the context of the present debate about patent remedies, the outline of the government 
holdup story would run as follows. It could start with increased court or agency review of patent 
licensing and royalty determinations made by private parties in the marketplace or by fact-finding 
juries in court cases. For example, one party to a license contract might seek to use the courts or an 
agency to rewrite that contract, say by nullifying particular terms or conditions that the party 
agreed to at the time of signing but later regretted. Or a party might attempt to reshape license 
negotiations through court or agency intervention or its threat. This risk is unfortunately 
exacerbated by some reform proposals, like those in the FTC Report that would significantly 
increase the government’s discretionary role in setting and maintaining in force the terms in patent 
licenses. The problem then could be exacerbated by the limited knowledge these government 
actors have compared to the individual market actors most directly involved. And it could stack, as 
the Patent Office, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commission, 
several influential court judges, and other areas of government each signal that they are receptive 
to taking actions on this front. This sort of industrial policy, where courts and government 
agencies intervene in commercial disputes to pick the winners and losers, would distort 
competition in the marketplace and would alter firm’s ex ante incentives to negotiate reasonable 
solutions in good faith. These would be harmful unintended consequences worth trying to avoid. 
 
 
III. NON-REMEDY DOCTRINES IN THE PATENT SYSTEM THAT MITIGATE 
SIGNIFICANT PATENT HOLDUP RISKS  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (2000).  
26 See F. Scott Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 106–09 (2007) (citing Richard. A. Epstein, The Permit 
Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. REV. 407 (1995)) (labeling the problem “permit thickets”); Sunita Parikh & 
Barry R. Weingast, A Comparative Theory of Federalism: India, 83 VA. L. REV. 1593, 1608 (1997) (labeling the 
problem “License Raj”).  
Although the risk of patent holdup by patentees is a problem that can be appropriately addressed 
by court and agency action, it is less severe than many patent critics postulate because a number of 
non-remedy doctrines in the patent system succeed in mitigating much of this risk. These doctrines 
go a significant distance to help ensure that the core definition of holdup, which requires both 
asset specificity and opportunism, is not triggered.27 They greatly facilitate the individualized and 
coordinated planning that help avoid holdup.  
While the substantive laws governing whether a particular technology meets the requirements 
for a valid patent often are seen as focusing on the merits of a given patent applicant’s claim to 
have made a good invention, they turn out to directly address a great deal of the patent holdup risk 
by helping to seriously decrease the chance that third parties to the patentee might make asset-
specific investments that could otherwise become the target of a patentee’s opportunistic decision 
to engage in holdup. Indeed, this patent holdup-mitigating view of the normative basis underlying 
the rules over the conditions for patentability provides descriptive coherence to a complex body of 
law that otherwise appears to have evolved haphazardly.28 For example, patent law’s doctrines 
relating to the prior art have long helped ensure that valid patent claims do not cover technology in 
which, or even towards which, potential patent holdup victims are likely to have significantly 
invested.29 Similarly, patent law’s doctrines relating to the disclosure that must be provided in a 
patent helps third parties avoid making reasonable investment backed expectations in the territory 
that could be targeted for threat of patent holdup by valid patent claims.30  
This latter point about the role of patent disclosures is especially important because it is 
inconsistent with the approach taken by recent commentators and policy makers when discussing 
the crux of their concern about patent holdup. More particularly, the FTC Report relied heavily on 
the premise that patents fail to give enough notice to allow third parties to avoid asset specificity 
problems, including the purported need to improve patent notice in its title.31 In so doing, the FTC 
Report built on academic work claiming that a core cause of patent holdup is the inability for its 
victims to have reasonably avoided being unaware of their trespass into patented territory before 
making their asset specific investments.32 But most of the recent high profile cases so often held 
out as examples of patent holdup deriving from a lack of patent disclosure or clarity do not support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The set of doctrines explored here does not exhaust the full set currently in use. Others include the availability of 
compulsory licensing in special cases, as well as a host of other existing “pressure-release valves” operating in the 
patent system through their role in the larger system of general commercial law, such as the uncertainty and delay of 
litigation, the use of limited liability business forms like the corporation, and bankruptcy law. See Richard A. Epstein & 
F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 71 (2011) (reviewing compulsory licensing); F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property 
and (Intended?) Pernicious Impacts on Innovation and Competition, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 11, 31–33 (2011) 
(reviewing existing set of pressure-release valves from the general body of commercial law).  
28 F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003). 
29 Id. at 76–99. By relying largely on factual determinations not subject to flexible discretion and administrative deference, 
these patentability rules long operated with remarkably low administrative, public choice, and both Type I and Type II 
error costs. See F. Scott Kieff, How Ordinary Judges and Juries Decide the Seemingly Complex Technological 
Questions of Patentability over the Prior Art, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 471 
(F. Scott Kieff ed., Academic Press 2003). Recent shifts towards administrative approaches to deciding these issues may 
undermine these salutary features by making them more amenable to flexible administrative discretion and deference, 
thereby leaving them less effective in mitigating market-based holdup problems as well as more subject to political 
influence by large, established firms. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent Validity Litigation over Second 
Window Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do The Trick?, 157 U. PA. 
L. Rev. 1937 (2009).  
30 Kieff, supra note 29, at 99–105.  
31 FTC Report, supra note 4, at 22.  
32 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 29–72 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008) (cited by FTC Report, supra note 4, at 81 n.46, in support of 
the claim that patents are difficult to interpret “across the board”). 
this claim.33 In these cases the patents were adjudicated through extensive litigation to have 
provided disclosures that were adequate rather than insufficient, to enable anyone of reasonable 
skill in the particular technological art to which the patent pertains to make themselves fully aware 
of what the patent covers and what it does not just by reading the published patents themselves.  
This does not mean that the socially optimal level of due diligence searching by potential 
patent infringers would actually turn up every valid patent claim that avoids the prior art and sets 
forth a legally adequate disclosure. There are surely patents that are not infringed or are invalid, 
such as those that provide inadequate disclosure, or are valid and infringed but sufficiently far 
afield that even with diligent good faith searches, locating them is too difficult. Some areas of 
technology may be more susceptible to these risks than others.34 This category of patents could 
leave manufacturers open to the type of unaware asset specific investment that, if met with 
opportunism by the patentee, would satisfy the definition of patent holdup.  
Note, however, that such risk is further mitigated by a host of informal, voluntary private 
ordering tools evolved by participants within the patent system. These include reliance on standard 
setting organizations (SSOs), direct interaction among participants in the marketplace for patented 
technologies including licensing, general reputation and repeat play, unilateral commitments out to 
all in the marketplace to offer licenses on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms (or 
even royalty-free), and a general willingness to license rather than litigate.35  
To be sure, these non-remedy doctrines in patent law combined with the private ordering tools 
may still not sufficiently mitigate all risk of patent holdup. Manufacturers do face the risk that an 
appropriate due diligence search may fail to uncover a relevant patent before appropriate asset 
specific investments are made; and a patentee may then opportunistically engage in patent holdup. 
This remaining risk is discussed below. 
 
 
IV. PATENT HOLDUP RISKS IN THE CONTEXT OF PATENT REMEDIES  
 
As the non-remedy doctrines in patent law do not sufficiently mitigate the risk of patent holdup, 
those remaining risks generally can be divided into two types. One is a residual risk of patent 
holdup that the patent remedy doctrines should mitigate. The second is a risk of reverse patent 
holdup (or licensee holdup) that should at least not be exacerbated by the introduction of new 
policies targeted too narrowly at patent holdup. Both of these two types of risks can be felt more 
keenly in the context of standard-setting. But focused attention to the cause of each of these two 
types of patent holdup risk can help develop reform proposals more tailored to better mitigating 
those that are significant problems while better avoiding the unintended consequences of causing 
other significant problems. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 2, at 24–25 (citing high-profile cases in which large companies RIM, eBay, and 
Microsoft brought unsuccessful challenges to, inter alia, the disclosures of various patents).  
34 But fitting any particular technology into the proper category can face more than the usual line drawing problems. 
Taking in the aggregate all of the arguments made about patents brings this point into high relief: high tech products are 
said to be so componentized that the patent notice problem is so much worse for them (more components equals more 
targets) that the entire category should be exempt from patents, while low tech products are said to be so simple that the 
entire category should be treated as per se unpatentable for being obvious, and biomedicine products are said to be so 
essential that all of their patents merit compulsory license to entities further down the production chain. If each of these 
arguments is taken for its full effect, the practical business impact of a categorization decision would matter little 
because any particular patent can be ignored by the market so long as the patent can credibly be labeled as a member of 
at least one of these categories. Indeed, the effort spent fitting a given technology into the right category may merely 
distract from the overall combined effect of treating each specific category with enhanced skepticism about patent 
enforcement.  
35 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 2, at 8–26.  
A. Residual Patent Holdup Risk 
 
The moment at which the risk of patent holdup often is seen most starkly is when a potential 
infringer is contemplating the remedies for infringement of some particular patent about which she 
was unaware when making significant asset specific investments in the activity alleged to be 
infringing. Much of the literature attributes the blame for this surprise to a characteristic of patent 
infringement liability that distinguishes it from liability for infringing tangible forms of property.36 
A typical case of patent infringement is a type of offense that lawyers call “strict liability” 
because the infringer’s intent is usually irrelevant to the question of whether there will be liability, 
as distinguished from questions about the amount of liability.37 Many areas of law operate this 
way. For example, a person’s liability for taking your car exists regardless of whether the taker 
knew who the proper owner was, with a base level of liability that likely is not much more than an 
obligation to return the car or an objective measure of its value to the true owner. Enforcement 
approaches like this are said to be “in rem” (“in the thing”), without regard to the particular in 
personam characteristics of the taker, such as intent. One benefit of such in rem enforcement rules 
is that they impose relatively low information costs on all third parties to the asset. The world of 
non-owners need only know that they are not owners, in order to determine their duties with 
respect to the thing, which essentially are to leave it alone. They don’t have to know who the 
owner is, or what arrangements the owner or owners may have with each other, such as joint 
ownership, ownership divided over time as in the case of a life estate followed by a future interest, 
or some contingent interest like a mortgage. Critics of patent remedies point out that this 
information cost savings for property rights in land is not available for patents because unlike 
patents, assets that are tangible, like a car or land, rely on their physicality to accomplish the low 
search and information costs of in rem enforcement.38 After all, it is easier to become aware that 
you have walked onto land that is not your own than it is to become aware that some third party 
received a patent on what you are doing.  
While patent critics are right that patents lack the same physicality of a car or plot of land, 
they are wrong to imply that such physicality is required to keep third party information costs to a 
minimum. Recording and registration systems39 have long been successfully used by societies to 
record a host of intangible property interests, such as easements and mortgages, which like patents 
are defined using mere abstract words rather than physical markers. The search and other 
information costs imposed on third parties for these intangible property rights remain sufficiently 
bearable that they have enjoyed stable persistent use throughout US history and are subject to 
extensive market transactions in primary as well as secondary and other derivative markets. 
Furthermore, while entitlements to both the tangible and intangible property rights in physical 
assets like cars and land are governed by different bodies of law in each state and recorded in 
repositories spread among a vast number of county and municipal recording offices, using a range 
of standards for legal language and form, the search and information costs on third parties facing 
patents are comparatively much lower because patents are centrally filed and searchable online for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See, e.g., Bessen & Meuer, supra note 33. See also James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meuer, The Private and 
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26 (2011).  
37 To be sure, if the particular claim in the asserted patent is limited by intent, then intent would be part of the basic 
infringement analysis for that particular claim in the patent. But there is debate about whether such intent limitations are 
even allowed in patents. Furthermore, indirect and group liability for patent infringement also can require proof of 
intent, such as intent to induce infringement by another or intent to form a legally recognizable partnership with another.  
38 Benito Arruñada, Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal and Economic Conceptions of Property Rights 
in a Coasean Framework, 59 INT’L REV. ECON. 121 (2012).  
39 In a recording system, all documents of title are filed (usually in copy, not original) in some publicly searchable 
government repository with no particular administrative review other than perhaps for form and payment of some filing 
fee to earn recordation. Registration systems involve the added step of purging conflicting entries when new ones are 
filed.  
free using one set of forms and a single body of case law governs their text.40 Simply put, the 
centralized and standardized publication of patents goes a very long way in addressing the risk that 
infringers will be caught unaware.41  
But even search and information costs that have been decreased by centralization and 
standardization can be a drag on the system. Patent critics point to many examples in which a 
party considering whether to manufacture a relatively inexpensive consumer product, like a 
microwave oven or laptop computer that contains hundreds or thousands of components that may 
be subject to an even larger number of patents, would experience very high costs to search out, 
carefully read, and receive advice of legal counsel about all of those patents. Without incurring 
those costs, however, such a manufacturer could make asset specific investments in a factory, and 
so forth, and then end up infringing some or even several of those patents totally unaware. Such a 
manufacturer would be at risk of patent holdup if the owners of those patents engaged in 
opportunism of the type Williamson defined as involving “calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, 
obfuscate, and otherwise confuse.”42  
One essential precursor to this particular manufacturer’s status as a possible victim of patent 
holdup is the decision to not incur the search costs to make itself fully aware of the patent 
landscape, thereby preventing the surprise element necessary for any type of holdup. As explored 
in more depth in other work, concerns about this group can be decreased once its constituent 
subgroups are explicitly categorized.43 Specifically, manufacturers that do not seem to have 
accounted ex ante for given patented technology can be placed into one of four subgroups, only 
some of which call for intervention.  
The parties within subgroup 1 are not even available for patent holdup because they turn out 
to be correct in planning not to need the patented technology. They either did not include it in their 
plans or can remove it at sufficiently low cost because they have made no asset specific 
investment. In this case, the patent holder has no leverage to extract patent holdup with the threat 
of a suit.  
The parties within subgroup 2 have made asset specific investments thinking they would not 
be at risk of being frustrated by a patent or patents but were not correct in their plans. Because 
members of this subgroup were caught unaware having made asset specific investments, they may 
be at risk for patent holdup, if the patentees they face approach them opportunistically. But this 
subgroup can be divided into three further bushels according to the level of investment they made 
into planning around the possibility of third-party patents. From a societal perspective, these firms 
may have invested too little, just the right amount, or too much in pre-asset-specific investment 
due diligence. Although the reforms urged by patent critics would eliminate incentives to invest at 
the socially excessive level, they also would eliminate incentives to invest at the other levels as 
well, thereby exposing patentees to reverse patent holdup and short-circuiting incentives for 
private ordering among all participants in the marketplace for patented technologies. The main 
benefit of the framework we outline in Part 0, below, is that it targets only the socially excessive 
patent clearance investments and thereby avoids the other unintended consequences.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 1, at 24. 
41 Like the patent system, the trademark system has a similar registration system for marks in use, as well as for marks that 
someone intends to put to use. In addition, the chance of an alleged infringer being caught unaware with respect to any 
unregistered marks is mitigated by the trademark system’s requirement that any rights in such marks will be contingent 
upon a showing by the one claiming ownership of the mark that it has been known to a broad base of market participants 
to have been functioning like a mark. The copyright system also pays similar attention to ensuring infringers are not 
caught unaware. Copyright registration is required before various forms of enhanced damages are available for 
infringement; and the underlying case of liability depends on whether there has been some actual copying. Independent 
origination is a complete defense to a charge of copyright infringement. 
42 Williamson, supra note 10, at 378. 
43 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 1, at 19. 
The parties within subgroup 3 include those who made unlicensed asset specific investments 
in technologies that are patented but who were correct in anticipating the patentees will not be 
opportunistic, perhaps because of other business dealings. Because opportunism is a necessary 
ingredient to the holdup recipe, this subgroup falls outside of concerns and therefore should not be 
targeted by remedies for patent holdup.  
The parties in subgroup 4 are those whose planning was to succeed in getting courts or 
government agencies to intervene on their behalf to obtain better patent licensing terms than 
available through voluntary ex ante negotiation. This group can be thought of opportunistic in 
their own rights, as they impose the social costs of exposing patentees to reverse patent holdup and 
short-circuiting incentives for private ordering among all participants in the marketplace for 
patented technologies.  
Under this taxonomy, it is socially beneficial for a party to be in any of the following three 
subgroups: 1, 3, and the bushel within 2, who invest in patent clearance activities at a socially 
optimal level. A party who meets these criteria has not overly invested in clearance costs and has 
either engaged in voluntary transactions before infringement, doesn’t need a patent license, or is 
able to get one even post-investment at affordable rates from the patentee. Simply put, none of 
these parties faces patent holdup and so is not a sympathetic target for any policy reforms urged 
under the name of patent holdup prevention.  
But it is socially destructive to encourage parties to be in the bushel of subgroup 2 that 
invested in patent clearance costs at a socially excessive level. The system should be sympathetic 
to those infringers who prove they acted in good faith (that is, after a reasonable clearance search) 
and who made large, irreversible investments in reliance on the well informed view, where if they 
had known about the patent ex ante they would have had a sufficiently easy time designing around 
it (the cost of actually obtaining and putting to use a truly available non-infringing substitute was 
roughly the same) but now, ex post, the large, asset specific sunk cost they made leaves them 
vulnerable to opportunism by an unscrupulous patentee.44 Policies and institutional procedures 
should be targeted towards decreasing the chance that patent remedies strike these parties too hard, 
which would provide counterproductive incentives for more parties to fall into the bushel of 
subgroup 2 that invested in patent clearance costs at a socially excessive level. 
 
B. Reverse Patent Holdup Risk 
 
It also is socially destructive to encourage parties to be in subgroup 4 (those using the courts or 
government agencies to better their licensing terms as compared to private negotiation), as some 
proposals aimed at eliminating patent holdup risks would do. The extent of subgroup 4 erodes the 
diffuse incentives patents otherwise provide to all those in the market for commercializing 
patented technologies.45 This subgroup is evidence of socially excessive infringement of a type 
that exposes patentees to reverse patent holdup in that it decreases the incentives of potential 
contracting parties to coordinate with each other around patents. For example, patentees and 
putative licensees and other investors will have decreased incentives to make their asset specific 
investments in the patent ex ante if they expect that some large manufacturer will enjoy favorable 
remedies by showing up later uninvited. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting 
eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571 (2008).  
45 See, e.g., Layne-Farrar, Llobet & Padilla, supra note 1 (demonstrating how one restrictive licensing cap proposed to 
address patent holdup of licensees within SSOs would actually lead to lower SSO participation, reduced R&D 
investment, and increased patent holdup). 
C. Special Risks of the Standard Setting Context 
 
The above points hold for patents in general, and indeed for all intellectual property, but an 
important wrinkle is introduced by patents within the SSO context. In particular, the standard 
setting process can exacerbate problems of both patent holdup and reverse patent holdup (that is, 
holdup by patent holders of licensees and holdup by licensees of patent holders).  
When firms cooperate to define the interoperability rules for various components and 
products—such as with mobile phones—the “essential” nature of certain patented technology for 
compliance with the defined standard can “lock in” manufacturers and patentees, creating a 
circumstance ripe for opportunistic behavior. More specifically, technologies (many of which will 
be patented) may compete with one another while the SSO members consider the options for the 
best standard, but once the standard is chosen this competition ceases, by design. After the 
standard is defined, then, members may no longer have any viable substitutes to the patents.46 As a 
result, “lock in” is indeed a possibility. However, such standards are publicly known and typically 
have explicit intellectual property policies, thus the manufacturers cannot fairly be said to have 
been unaware of potentially relevant intellectual property rights, which is one of the necessary 
precursors to patent holdup.  
In fact, most SSOs provide a number of information elements that work to limit the possibility 
of patent holdup. First, SSOs typically have rosters of active members, so that the universe of 
potential patent holders is largely known. Second, most request IPR disclosures of any patents that 
might be or become “essential” to the practice of the standard.47 Even when these disclosures are 
not precise (as so-called blanket disclosures do not list specific patents but rather make general 
commitments to license any relevant patents held by the disclosing party on Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory—RAND—terms), the general disclosure record puts on notice any firm wishing to 
implement the standard—that firm can then conduct patent searches for the firm making the 
general disclosure. Third, most SSOs have licensing policies aimed at reducing ex post patent 
holdup, such as requesting RAND licensing, or less commonly requiring royalty-free licensing.48  
Many have complained that RAND commitments provide little relief for patent holdup 
problems because they are ill-defined.49 While it is true that no SSO, to our knowledge, actually 
defines what “reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing actually means in practice, there is 
consensus that at a minimum a RAND commitment ensures good faith efforts at licensing, such 
that a patent holder cannot refuse to license a willing licensee (outright or constructively) or 
license exclusively—rights the patent holder would otherwise have. Giving up these rights has a 
meaningful impact on licensing negotiations: a patent holder within an SSO no longer has as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Note that this is not as straightforward as it might at first seem. Even patent claims that appear to exactly reflect the 
technical specifications drafted for a given standard may nonetheless have workable non-infringing substitutes, such as 
when the courts take a restrictive interpretation of the patent’s claims or when the feature in the standard is optional.  
47 Some have decried SSO disclosure rules as encouraging “over-disclosure,” and indeed many do, in that patent holders 
make declarations of potentially essential patents. Given that determining genuine essentiality is a difficult, time-
consuming, and subjective task (requiring a legal and technical comparison of patent claims to standard specifications), 
this may be a preferable approach to the alternative of “under-disclosure,” which would enable more opportunistic 
patent ambush. But a key point to keep in mind is that there are important reasons to think that those industrial actors 
actually participating in the SSO will be better than government actors in titrating the rules to the best levels. See supra 
note 25 and accompanying text.  
48 Some SSOs add “Fair” before RAND, asking for a FRAND commitment. RAND and FRAND are generally viewed as 
equivalent. Only one SSO (VITA), to the best of our knowledge, requires disclosure of maximum terms and conditions 
before a patented technology will be considered for inclusion in a standard. IEEE has a voluntary licensing terms and 
conditions disclosure policy, but few members have taken advantage of it. 
49 See, e.g., Marc Rysman & Timothy Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments (Boston Univ., 
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper, No 2010-056 2011), available at 
http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/documents/published/NAAST.pdf. 
 
threat point walking away from negotiations. Knowing this, licensees have increased bargaining 
leverage. 
In the same spirit of mitigating patent holdup on the part of patent holders, SSOs also seek to 
avoid the problem of reverse patent holdup on the part of licensees by resisting efforts by private 
parties, as well as courts and government agencies, to force patentees, who have already sunk the 
costs of inventing and patenting standard-specific technology, to offer low royalty terms as a 
condition for supporting inclusion of that patented technology in a standard.50 In that same vein, 
many SSOs also acknowledge preferences for reciprocity: firms can condition a license to their 
disclosed potentially essential patents on receiving a license to the counter party’s disclosed 
potentially essential patents.51 In general, a careful balance among the needs of all SSO members, 
patent holders and implementers, is often an explicit goal of SSO intellectual property policies.52  
The framework outlined below is centered on balancing the legitimate needs and expectations 
of both patent holders and manufacturers. As such, it mitigates both the risk of patent holdup and 
of reverse patent holdup. 
 
 
V. CONTRASTING FRAMEWORKS FOR MITIGATING PATENT HOLDUP RISK 
 
The market and institutional features discussed above play an important role in mitigating the risk 
of patent holdup, but even when such mechanisms work well, disputes will be inevitable. In that 
instance, courts offer a backstop. We therefore conclude our analysis by contrasting the popular 
framework and our proposed framework for the courts to follow when setting remedies for patent 
infringement. The goal is to find a workable and balanced approach for further limiting holdup 
risk, in any form that it might take, with an eye towards both increasing direct, palliative effects as 
well as limiting harmful unintended consequences. 
 
A. Long-Established Remedies Framework  
 
Both the popular approach and our proposed approach are largely consistent with most elements 
of the basic framework for patent remedies that has long been established. This long-established 
framework basically includes three categories of remedies: those that compensate for past 
infringement, which essentially boil down to money damages; those that prevent or deter future 
infringement, which essentially boil down to injunctions; and those that are designed to repair for 
and deter acts of willful misbehavior in the marketplace and in court, which essentially boil down 
to punitive damages and attorney fees. 
For injunctions, whether preliminary or permanent, there has long been a four-factor test, 
which was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court’s 2006 eBay decision, under which a 
“plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”53 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 1, at 22–23.  
51 See, e.g., ETSI Rules of Procedure, Annex 6: ETSI IPR Policy § 6.1 (Nov. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.etsi.org/images/etsi_ipr-policy.pdf (“The above undertaking may be made subject to the condition that those 
who seek licenses agree to reciprocate.”) [hereinafter ETSI IPR Policy]. 
52 Karsten Meinhold, Chairman, ETSI IPR Special Comm., The ETSI IPR Policy: A Key Element for the Success of ETSI’s 
Globally-Applicable Standards, EC Workshop on “Intellectual Property Rights in ICT Standardization” (Nov. 19, 
2008). 
53 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Significant debate exists about the extent to which this four-
factor test was as well established as the Supreme Court stated. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 
The key is that these four factors are not to be taken together into some sort of all-things-
considered-balance; instead they are to be seen as individual narrow categories of special 
exception to the general rule that an injunction will issue when the patent has been shown to be 
infringed and not invalid. 54 For example, the third factor would only be triggered in the case of a 
grossly disproportionate hardship on the defendant, not merely more harm than suffered by the 
patentee.55 Similarly, the fourth factor, public interest, is centered on concerns about truly serious 
threats to public health.56  
The approach to damages has similarly had its own set of four long accepted principles. The 
first principle acknowledges that while the patentee should not be able to directly go after the 
infringer’s profits,57 the infringer’s profits may be at least relevant to a damages calculation58 so as 
to give at least some force to the most famous of equitable maxims: “No one shall be permitted to 
profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his 
own iniquity.”59 The second principle allows the patentee to recoup its own lost profits if it can 
show that the infringer’s customers would have bought (or licensed) from the patentee, instead of 
from some truly available non-infringing substitute that was roughly the same as the patented 
technology, and that the patentee would have made those sales at a profit.60 The third principle 
ensures that at least some damages will be paid by explicitly stating in the statute that patent 
damages should be no less than a reasonable royalty.61 And the fourth principle allows for either 
side in a dispute to receive punitive damages and reimbursement for attorney’s fees if the other 
side is proven to have engaged in willful misbehavior in the marketplace or court. The first three 
of these principles target what is known as “ordinary damages,” and the fourth targets what is 
known as “enhanced damages.”  
The key point of departure between the popular approach to reform and our suggested 
approach is the set of presumptions, burdens, and procedures to be applied to these long-
established rules. At a basic level, the currently popular approach has been to take almost any 
opportunity to tilt the playing field towards infringers and away from patentees, with laser-like 
focus on mitigating the risk that infringers will be subject to patent holdup by patentees. Our 
suggested approach is designed to tailor the rules to primarily help only the specific subgroup of 
actors who have proven behaviors that would make them victims of true patent holdup, as 
described above. It has the secondary benefit of mitigating the risk facing the specific subgroup of 
actors who have sound reasons for thinking they are at risk of becoming victims of holdup and so 
face the dilemma of having to invest sunk costs in asset specific investments or socially excessive 
costs in patent clearance. It also has the tertiary benefit of not causing the unintended 
consequences we outlined earlier of approaches that unduly tilt the playing field in favor of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
TEX. L. REV. 505 (2010); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 
27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 (2007) (‘‘Remedies specialists had never heard of [eBay’s] four-point test.’’). 
54 F. Scott Kieff & Henry E. Smith, How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY 
CHANGES WE CAN AFFORD 55 (Terry Anderson & Richard Sousa eds., Hoover Inst. Press 2009).  
55 Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2102 
(1997); Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1045–46 (1964); 
42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions (2005).  
56 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (dissolving an injunction against an 
infringing sewage-disposal system). While the geography of the line-drawing this factor does around public health may 
be hard to locate with precision, it is hard to imagine it being so expansive as to include the attenuated and indirect 
threat of slightly increased production costs for cell phones, laptop computers, television, and games.  
57 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505–07 (1964) (interpreting the Act of 1946 §§ 
67 & 70). 
58 See Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 653–56 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
59 Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).  
60 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
61 Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. 637 F.3d 1269, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“the floor for a damage award is no less than a reasonable royalty”).  
class of all infringers, which is the significant risk and actual realization of both reverse-patent 
holdup against the class of all patentees and all their contracting parties as well as the 
anticompetitive coalitions that the general political science literature teaches can all too easily 
form, with the end result being government holdup. 
To be sure, the approach we take in highlighting these subgroups may draw the types of 
questions and criticisms generally raised whenever a broad category is subdivided. Some may 
wonder how well courts, agencies, or legislators may be expected to correctly identify the 
particular subgroup applicable to a given case, the boundaries among the subgroups, and how 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive they are. But we see these as features of our approach rather 
than flaws because our general approach uses the insight about the mere existence of these 
subgroups to inform approaches that will constructively engage their existence without having to 
make any of the particular determinations just mentioned. Put differently, all of these questions or 
criticisms would be serious detractions from our proposal if it hinged on addressing any of them; 
but because it does not, they are inapposite. In contrast, the highlighting of these subgroups 
reveals a host of shortcomings in more popular approaches. 
At bottom, we think that popular proposals for limiting the risks of patent holdup generally 
have too myopic a view and thus would likely create more problems than they solve in the end. No 
remedy will be perfect for all parties at all times—the markets in which patents matter most are 
large, complex, and diverse—so our concerns are not directed towards any individual proposal in 
particular. Instead, we are trying to encourage commentators and policy makers to at least consider 
that in practice among private actors in the marketplace their own needs to balance incentives and 
effects for all parties means that compromises must be made in order for agreements to be 
reached. As a result, when courts or agencies come in later to re-write deals that have already been 
cut and on which reliance has already been made, they can do more harm than good in the name of 
trying to get the remedy “just right” as viewed narrowly from just one perspective, such as through 
the lens of licensees worried about potential patent holdup. The goal should instead be to lay the 
ground rules in a way that first encourages the parties to “do the right thing” from the start and 
which leaves open the possibility for welfare-enhancing renegotiations when such ex ante 
agreements do not work out. 
 
B. Popular Reform Approach 
 
Recent years have seen many proposals for “fixing” the purported problem of patent holdup, and 
many of these have been implemented through recent legislative and judicial actions.62 Unsatisfied 
with these measures, those who believe the U.S. patent system has reached and remains at the 
crisis stage seek yet additional changes to many of the long established patent remedy doctrines. 
They target injunctions, ordinary damages, and enhanced damages. 
Two proposals relating to injunctions are focused on patents declared as “essential” to 
standard setting organizations (referred to as “standard essential patents” or SEPs). Of special note 
in this category is the debate over whether SEPs, which are bound by RAND commitments, are 
eligible for injunctive relief. The FTC Report expresses great unease with the use of injunctive 
relief in patent cases in general, but especially in the particular setting of SSOs. For example, the 
FTC Report recommends that the case for granting injunctions should be viewed as especially 
weak whenever the patent is subject to a RAND commitment in the SSO setting.63 Recent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See Kieff, supra note 27, at 35–41; F. Scott Kieff, Patently Bad Policy, DEFINING IDEAS, Nov. 16, 2011; F. Scott Kieff, 
File First, Invent Later?, DEFINING IDEAS, June 13, 2011; F. Scott Kieff, Patent Reform Goes Haywire, DEFINING 
IDEAS, June 10, 2011; F. Scott Kieff, Welcome to Patent Purgatory, DEFINING IDEAS, June 9, 2011; F. Scott Kieff, The 
Perils of Patent Reform, DEFINING IDEAS, June 7, 2011.  
63 FTC Report, supra note 4, at 28, 234–35. 
submissions to the ITC have argued that a RAND commitment outright precludes SEP holders 
from even seeking an injunction.64 
The central problem with these proposed reforms is that they would have overly broad 
application. Categorical rules against the seeking of injunctions for a particular class of patents 
will not simply prevent ex post patent holdup; it will also tip the ex ante licensing negotiation 
playing field such that reverse patent holdup, where licensees force below FRAND royalties, is a 
greater risk.65 It also invites increased costs of court or agency review as every infringer is 
rationally drawn to make decisions about what to invest in litigation as the issue turns on the 
extent of their own inefficiently sunk costs that are otherwise at stake of being lost through the 
injunction. 
For example, interpreting a RAND commitment as preventing patent holders from ever 
seeking an injunction would overlook the dynamic impact it would have on incentives for putative 
licensees to take a license up front.66 More specifically, infringers would rationally consider the 
benefits of simply avoiding any up front offer to take a license on any terms, RAND or not, 
knowing that on the back end they will not have to face an injunction for any patent that makes its 
way into any RAND commitment from within an SSO. To avoid this perverse incentive effect, 
infringers should not be able to avoid an injunction even in a RAND setting unless they can show 
that they actually made good faith efforts to enter into a license under RAND terms that the 
patentee had offered or would have accepted with some actual or potential licensee. 
It would be an invitation for opportunism by infringers to let the rule be that merely asserting 
one’s own willingness to become a licensee on self-defined terms would allow one to obtain a 
license on those terms.67 Infringers could always say they want a license, all the while doing things 
that they know will slow down or derail the process but which can be justified on some grounds. 
It also would be perverse to suggest that a patentee who doesn’t offer a RAND license should 
get potentially higher license rates and more likely access to an injunction. This behavior would 
place the parties in our subgroup 4, involving some manufacturers using the courts or agencies to 
obtain better terms and conditions than could be achieved through good faith negotiations, as 
defined above. Such a rule would incentivize fewer RAND commitments and would also increase 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Richard J. Gilbert, Carl Shapiro, Thomas F. Cotter & Stefania Fusco, RAND Patents and 
Exclusion Orders: Submission of 19 Economics and Law Professors to the International Trade Commission (Santa 
Clara U. Leg. Stud. Research Paper No. 07-12, 2012). While Google recently committed to antitrust authorities to limit 
its own ability to enforce those newly acquired patents to the extent they are subject to enforceable commitments to be 
licensed on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, that new commitment does not appear to limit 
injunctions if the other party does not agree to terms that are FRAND; nor does it reach all of the newly acquired patents 
or any of the patents within Google’s treasure trove of original patents on search. In re Motorola Mobility LLC & 
Google Inc., No. 1210120, at 4, 7 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolado.pdf (“‘FRAND Patent’ means a Patent Claim solely 
to the extent such Patent Claim is subject to a FRAND Commitment. A Patent Claim shall be considered a FRAND 
Patent only with respect to the practice of such claim implementing the Standard for which the relevant FRAND 
Commitment was made, and not with respect to the practice of such claim in any other way outside the scope of the 
relevant FRAND Commitment. . . . Respondents shall cease and desist from directly or indirectly making any future 
claims for Covered Injunctive Relief based on alleged Infringement of a FRAND Patent except as permitted under this 
Order. . . . [N]othing in this Order shall . . . require Respondents to give a FRAND Commitment with respect to any 
Standard or proposed Standard.”). 




67 For example, in Apple v. Motorola, Apple announced on the eve of trial that it would abide by the judge’s RAND 
determination only if that determination fell below $1 per device. See Alison Frankel, How Apple Botched Its Fair Rate 
Case Against Motorola, THOMSON REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2012, http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/11/06/how-
apple-botched-its-fair-rate-case-against-motorola/; Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 
2012). 
royalty rates and injunction frequencies to levels that are too high, thereby frustrating socially 
beneficial coordination incentives. 
To put the SEP injunction question in the language of the famous four-factor test for 
injunctions discussed above, the irreparable harm that would be created by following the FTC 
recommendation for no injunctions on SEPs would derive from encouraging standards 
implementers to wait-and-see rather than entering into licensing arrangements earlier. That would 
deprive everyone in the patent marketplace of vital streams of both revenues and technologies. 
The promise of some money remedy later is cold comfort to all those who suffer the harm caused 
by preventing such important markets from even coming into existence. The bottom line is that 
although obtaining injunctions may be rare in the settings of SSOs and RAND commitments, 
taking them as far off the table as the FTC Proposal envisions would remove from the patentee’s 
toolkit a remedy with a significant value, thereby harming everyone in the market including 
consumers. 
Other proposals target ordinary damages. These proposed changes delve down far into the 
arcane weeds of the inherently highly speculative process of determining what an alternative 
universe might have looked like if there had been no infringement. They lead to serious 
conversations about extreme possibilities that have not been shown to be sufficiently likely to ever 
exist that they should govern sound policy choices about the rules to use every day in actual cases. 
For example, one extreme dichotomy that has emerged from one leading commentator views 
intellectual property rights in brand names like Coke and Pepsi to be so differentiated and 
powerful that they each cordon off their own monopoly worthy of extensive antitrust regulation, 
such that an economic market definition exercise would conclude that Coke was not a substitute 
for Pepsi, and vice versa.68 At the same time, however, this same commentator argues that for 
many patents “the patented feature adds no value.”69 The reality in many cases surely falls 
somewhere in the middle, far away from these two extreme poles. 
 One of these extreme poles is especially hard to imagine as offering practical policy reform 
guidance. This is the one that views patent infringement as conferring no value on the infringer, 
sometimes labeled as no marginal value or no incremental value.70 Last year, in the Apple v. 
Motorola case, where Apple’s patent on the horizontal swiping motion used with touch screens on 
cellular phones and handheld computers played a central role, Judge Posner made the substance of 
his views about patent holdup clear. Specifically, Judge Posner commented on the record that 
alternative swipes, such as a vertical swipe, were sufficiently acceptable alternatives to the 
patented invention so as to render the invention “valueless.”71 In the same dispute, Judge Posner 
showed deep skepticism about even the possibility of proving any serious value for the design 
patents on the rectangular shape with rounded edges that often are used as the form factor for 
smartphones. According to the New York Times columnist Joe Nocera: 
 
Posner insists that [patentees] calculate precisely how much the infringing component is driving 
demand for the product. For things like rounded corners, it’s probably not much. “If they can meet 
that challenge, then fine. But it’s difficult,” [Posner] says.72 
 
To the extent Posner’s decision to dismiss the Motorola v. Apple case was based entirely on a 
failure of proof due to the purported failure of the patentees to offer any credible specific evidence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 
GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012).  
69 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup & Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2002 (2007). 
70 The recognition that true value, marginal value, or incremental value, vary hugely across individuals, and across time 
reveals a central flaw in the search for these values. See Epstein, Kieff & Spulber, supra note 1, at 20–21.  
71 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 11-cv-8540 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2012).  
72 Joe Nocera, Innovation Nation at War, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/opinion/nocera-innovation-nation-at-war.html.  
of particularized harm,73 then it is unremarkable with respect to the question about approaches to 
patent remedies. But to the extent it reflects a conclusion about the “true” value of the patented 
technologies or a new approach courts should use in setting such value, the decision overlooks key 
components of value and distorts the very nature of the valuation exercise. 
One key component is the simple evidence that consumers reveal a strong preference for 
devices having the patented features, whether because of their aesthetic or their function. 
Consider, for example, the seemingly silly feature of rounded edges for the phones. Entire schools 
of design thought have competed with each other over the aesthetic value attributable to looks that 
are overall angular versus overall rounded.74 In addition, the choice between angular and rounded 
brings with it similar tradeoffs in the functional realm. Rounded corners may provide a smoother 
exterior feel and greater ease when sliding the device into and out of pockets. But rounded corners 
also leave less room inside the device for important, feature-enhancing electronic components, 
especially given that dense-packing tends to work best when modular units making up a whole 
have corners that allow them to be stacked closely together, like lattices in a crystal or bricks in a 
wall. 
At a broader level, a quest for the “true” value of some patented technology, even in the 
context of a given individual licensee, is misleading. Economic theory on bargaining makes clear 
that most negotiations have multiple potential outcomes.75 This theory is particularly relevant for 
patent license negotiations, given the subjective nature of the valuation exercise.76 A single 
patented technology can offer different licensees dramatically different benefits (value) depending 
on the use to which the technology is put. Added to this baseline variation are differences in 
parties’ bargaining strength and risk preferences, based partly on each one’s other opportunities, 
which may also vary over time.77 Thus, even if the task for a court is to determine a reasonable 
royalty for a given patent used by a given infringer over a specified period of time, that exercise 
must make assumptions about the parties’ bargaining positions and risk preferences at the assumed 
hypothetical negotiation date. Each of those assumptions entails some uncertainty; the greater the 
uncertainty, the wider the range of possible royalty values that can be deemed “reasonable”.78 
Certainly some valuations will have higher probabilities than others, but the point remains that a 
single “true” value does not exist, at least in any knowable form. This reasoning holds for 
traditional patent infringement cases as well as for FRAND license disputes.79 The latter even add 
one more layer of uncertainty to the patent valuation exercise: it is not just a question of whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Opinion & Order, Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 11-cv-8540 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012) (noting failure of proof).  
74 See Keith Lang, Realization of Rounded Rectangles, IU & US BLOG (July 27, 2009, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.uiandus.com/blog/2009/7/26/realizations-of-rounded-rectangles.html. See also Anthony Tseng, Why 
Rounded Corners Are Easier on the Eyes, UX MOVEMENT BLOG (Aug. 17, 2011, 10:17 PM), 
http://uxmovement.com/thinking/why-rounded-corners-are-easier-on-the-eyes/.  
75 The seminal work here is by John Nash and is referred to as Nash Bargaining Theory. See John F. Nash, Jr., The 
Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).  
76 As Mark Schankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer conclude, “a wide array of damage measures may be consistent with the 
lost profit (lost royalty) doctrine of damages.” See Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions 
in Protecting Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001).  
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Motorola decision, the first court ruling on what a FRAND rate is. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., Case No. C10-1823JLR (Apr. 25, 2013) (Robart, J.) (“To decide whether Motorola’s 
opening offers were in good faith, a fact-finder must be able to compare them with a reasonable RAND royalty rate and, 
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79 For a discussion of the “range of reasonableness test” for evaluating FRAND offers, see Roger G. Brooks & Damien 
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and Reasonable” Terms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW: NEW FRONTIERS 389 (Steven 
Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011).  
the SEP is valid and infringed, but also whether it is truly essential for products that comply with 
the standard.80 
Most of the proposed reforms are motivated by appropriate skepticism about the weight of the 
various tiny morsels of evidence and often large inferences a patentee has offered by way of proof 
in establishing its calculation of a reasonable royalty or damages. As the discussion above makes 
clear, uncertainties and assumptions are unavoidable in any patent infringement case. But many 
areas of law are equally messy; the real world is often grey, not black and white. It is in this light 
that we argue that many of the proposals for patent litigation reform go too far in sweeping off the 
table entire areas of appropriate analysis, but not far enough in appreciating the high costs to all 
involved, including courts and agencies, of forcing the patentee to adduce evidence about a 
decision made long ago inside the secret business workings of the infringer’s enterprise to select 
the infringing technology over any alternatives that may or may not have existed at that time. The 
infringer is the lowest cost provider of this information, but also the party with the greatest 
incentives to not accurately maintain it or present it to the court. The infringer also is the one best 
able to have made the most intelligent decision at the time to balance the costs and benefits of 
deciding to use the infringing technology, and its sound business judgment should be due some 
deference when questions are raised about whether the choice of that technology carried any 
significant benefits. Two conceptual comparisons are especially apt. 
First, consider that throughout the law of business associations, including corporations and 
limited liability companies, the legal doctrine known as the business judgment rule largely 
prevents third parties from bringing into court any challenges that might question the value of 
decisions made by a business for having not created value for that business, absent sound reasons 
for asking whether the decision was invaded by conflict of interest or the product of some 
fundamentally flawed process.81 But today’s patent critics would go to the opposite end of the 
spectrum and require third parties and courts to now make precisely such determinations. They 
would make the third party to the infringer’s corporate enterprise—here, the patentee—bear the 
burden of proving with a high degree of precision, and the court or agency itself determining, the 
actual amount of the value the infringer obtained for itself by its prior decision to engage in the 
infringing activity. 
Second, consider that patent-critical judges like Posner tend to want to limit socially excessive 
clearance costs that manufacturers have to spend to avoid patent infringement. This is a laudable 
goal, but one that has a corollary. Such manufacturer watchdogs should be similarly concerned 
about socially excessive litigation costs that would ensue if every patentee and every court and 
agency assessing patent damages had to calculate out to a scientific certainty the precise benefit 
conferred by this particular infringer’s decision to engage in infringement. 
The severity of the burden placed on the patentee is particularly striking when one considers 
the approaches taken to establish patent value. One example of an evidentiary approach already in 
some use by courts that are skeptical about patent value is to exclude as unduly prejudicial 
evidence of the value paid to license the patent by other potential infringers in settlements. The 
idea stems from the realization that because patent rights confer on the patentee no affirmative 
rights to use the patented technology, and instead only confer the right to sue others to exclude 
them from the technology, every patent is in that sense a mere ticket to a lawsuit. But because 
litigation is extremely expensive and uncertain, there is a chance the patent license fees paid by 
others, perhaps especially in a litigation settlement, reflects merely the value of avoiding the cost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Recall that SEPs are merely declared as potentially essential for the practice of a standard. No SSO body makes any 
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determination can change over time (as recognized in the European Commission’s draft Guidelines on Technology 
Transfer Block Exemption Regulations, latest draft issued February 20, 2013).  
81 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).  
and uncertainty of baseless litigation rather than the value of some patented technology.82 Many 
patent critics would not even allow into evidence many measurements of value that other putative 
infringers placed on the patented technology. Certainly some forms of evidence may be more 
informative than others (for example, an arms-length license deal versus settlement of a baseless 
litigation), but hard and fast rules barring one form or another forget that in the real world 
information of any sort may be difficult to come by and a weakly informative piece of evidence 
can be better than no evidence at all. And while some settlement values may be more attributable 
to litigation transaction costs than to technological value, it would throw the baby out with the 
bathwater to exclude from evidence all valuations reached through settlement of litigation. 
Another such proposal would limit royalty rates assessed on the full market price of infringing 
products save when the evidence establishes that the patented technology is the driver of demand 
(the Entire Market Value Rule, or EMVR).83 The basis of the argument for restrictions on using 
EMVR as the royalty base rests on multi-component products. When the infringing product has 
numerous components, such as a laptop, and a particular patented technology reads on but-one of 
those components (say, video compression software), then payments assessed on the full product 
run the risk of yielding excessive royalties. As a matter of mathematics, of course, a 1-percent rate 
assessed on a $1,000 product yields the same $10/unit royalty payment as a 10-percent rate on a 
$100 component. That being said, when the $1,000 product is likely to be covered by 1,000 
patents (has 1,000 plus components), then depending on the value the patented technology 
contributes to the product, the most appropriate rate might be 0.001 percent, rather than 1 percent. 
That is the real issue: the rate that best reflects the value of a particular patented technology may 
be a number that looks “too small”, which can pose problems with jury trials. 
We recognize the royalty inflation that can occur for multi-component products. It is not that 
the proposed restrictions on EMVR are ill-founded, but rather that the restrictions are growing 
broader and broader, drifting farther from their origins in genuinely multi-component product 
infringements. Court rulings are now arguing that component-based royalties are required for all 
products, save when the patented technology is the sole driver of demand.84 The overly broad 
application of EMVR restrictions ignores important practicalities and real-world factors, such as 
the availability of objective pricing for components and the ability of patent holders to monitor 
component sales to ensure accurate royalty payments.85 
A similar flaw is inherent in calls to place fixed, binding caps on RAND rates as well. Some 
of these proposals are wholly unworkable: setting a common 5 percent aggregate royalty cap for 
SEPs,86 for instance, irrespective of the end products at issue or the value of the patented 
technologies at hand, is too far removed from economic theory to be taken seriously. Other 
proposals properly recognize that RAND rates will vary with the products and patents involved, 
such as the incremental value rule proposal.87 Under this proposal, royalty payments would be 
limited by comparison to the manufacturer’s “next best alternative” to the patented technology. 
However, many incremental value proposals still focus too narrowly on patent-holder holdup, 
ignoring other forms of holdup. Excessively focusing on the manufacturer’s next best alternative 	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would reward the least efficient manufacturers at the expense of both patentees and more efficient 
manufacturers. 
In particular, many incremental value proposals gloss over the baseline value competing 
technologies offer to a given product and ignore a patent holder’s incentives to participate in 
innovative endeavors.88 For example, suppose that patented technology A offers a universal and 
agreed upon “value” of “10” to implementers, while patented technology B offers a universal and 
agreed upon “value” of “15” to implementers. Under the strict interpretations of the incremental 
value rule, patent holder B would only be able to charge “5” for use of its patented technology, as 
that defines the increment of additional value offered to the implementer. This assumes, however, 
that competition between patented technologies A and B would push the price of patent A down to 
“0”—an assumption that may or may not be justified in the circumstances at hand.89 In short, 
interpretations of the incremental value rule like this one focus solely on the ex post problem: two 
(or more) patented technologies already exist (the R&D that produced them having been sunk and 
successful) and have no other uses, so manufacturers can exploit both of these facts to push the 
price of either technology below the value it contributes to the product (“10” or “15” in the above 
example). This interpretation of the incremental value rule entirely ignores what economists refer 
to as the “participation constraint”:90 if we want innovative firms to make those (soon to be sunk) 
R&D investments in the first instance, we need to provide them with an incentive to participate, 
namely the expectation of an adequate return on investment. Knowing that the return will be 
restricted to below the value contributed, far fewer innovators will invest in the first place, 
meaning there may be no competition over technologies at all that manufacturers can then take 
advantage of to compete down the price of a patented technology. As a result, unless it is very 
carefully defined and implemented, the incremental value rule would likely cause unintended 
harmful effects, such as reduced SSO participation and sub-optimal investment in innovation.91 
 
C. Suggested Reform Approach 
 
Our suggested approach is designed to tailor the rules to primarily help only the specific subgroup 
of actors who have proven behaviors that make them victims of true patent holdup. Infringers 
seeking reduced remedies should have to prove that they decided to sink costs in significant asset 
specific investments in reasonable reliance on having spent efforts in good faith at a level 
somewhere above a significantly socially suboptimal amount in either clearance costs or in 
negotiations with the particular patentee, and that the patentee has engaged in opportunism.92 
These infringers are victims of patent holdup and deserve relief. Patentees should be allowed to 
rebut this argument with countervailing evidence as well as evidence that they or their contracting 
parties have made asset specific investments, that the patentee engaged in any licensing 
discussions in similar good faith, and that the infringer has engaged in opportunism.  
First, in litigation the burden should be on the patentee, as it is currently, to prove damages. 
Patentees can pick the approach that best fits the evidence they can find, either lost profits or 
reasonable royalties (or mixtures thereof), again as is current practice and as required by statute. 	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Patentees of all sorts should be allowed to seek injunctions, and when they are able to satisfy the 
four factor test, those injunctions should be granted.  
But in contrast to the popular reform proposals, our approach would allow the patentee a 
wider berth with respect to the types of damages evidence that can be used. This recognizes that 
the task at hand is to offer reasonable chains of inference about a state of the world that is not real 
and never happened—the but-for world of no infringement—largely involving a decision to 
infringe that was made by the infringer, a long time ago. So long as the logic is sound the presence 
of inferential links in the chain should not make it subject to exclusion in its entirety. These 
inferences should merely go to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.  
Second, infringers have their opportunity to rebut the evidence presented by the patentee, as is 
current practice, and like the patentee the infringer should be given a relatively wide berth with 
respect to admissibility. This means that when a patentee satisfies its burden of proof, the burden 
shifts to the accused infringer. While theoretical harms like patent holdup or excessive royalties 
deriving from the application of EMVR may form the basis of a rebuttal, the evidence should be 
case specific. Theory only goes so far and can apply to either side—it takes facts to properly 
support a claim. If an infringer can show reasonable clearance costs, that showing should be a big 
factor in limiting remedies. We do not propose a bright line demarcating the difference between a 
clearance search that goes too far and one that goes just far enough—the established legal systems 
of equity and remedies have long recognized that such bright lines have the perverse impact of 
inviting parties to routinely dance up to and back and forth across them.93  
Our goal here is to highlight two contrasting concerns the law should be vigilant to address. 
The first concern is the realization that a manufacturer’s good faith clearance search should be 
respected, and indeed encouraged. This is the nugget of the true patent holdup problem and thus it 
should be the target of lower remedy approaches. The second concern builds on the views the 
Supreme Court recently articulated about willful blindness when discussing the standard to be 
used when determining whether one party actively induced another to infringe a patent. As the 
Court pointed out, willful blindness exists when two requirements are met: “the defendant must 
subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists;” and “the defendant must take 
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”94 In that case, the party found to have been 
willfully blind had specific knowledge of a patent but asked an outside lawyer to conduct a 
minimal clearance search without informing that lawyer of the same patent. When the lawyer 
reported back that he found no patents in the way, the party forged ahead and argued later in court 
when caught for infringement that it lacked a culpable level of intent. The jury, the appellate court, 
and the Supreme Court disagreed and had little trouble pinning blame on that level of willful 
blindness.  
Third, courts should be mindful of certain arguments to generally avoid and others to be more 
attentive to. One core element of value that too often is overlooked: option value.95 An infringer 
benefits from the option to infringe while not paying royalties. Sometimes that infringement will 
go uncaught, meaning the expected value of knowingly (or with a blind eye toward due diligence) 
infringing can be positive. And anytime there is infringement the patentee and its contracting 
parties have lost the option to act exclusively, or to act only under the details of their RAND 
commitments as opposed to some particular infringer’s subject view about what is RAND. The 
cost of this lost option must be included in any rational damages calculation designed to assess the 	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value conveyed to the infringer. Lastly, damages mitigation rules that focus too much on the 
infringer’s costs make no economic sense. In particular, if an infringer claims it could easily work 
around a patented technology at little to no cost, the court’s first question should be whether it did 
so as soon as the charges were levied against it. If it has not done so, the next question should be 
why not? In other words, mere assertions of readily available non-infringing substitutes do little to 
forward the inquiry; evidence is required and actual action and inaction provide meaningful 
evidence of their own.  
We think that if court and agency reviews of damages only keep in mind these basic 
principles they will go a long way towards strengthening incentives for parties to enter into 
voluntary exchanges, mitigating the risk of patent holdup in both directions, without placing a 





Further empirical research may be appropriate to reveal the precise extent and nature of patent 
holdup due to patent remedies so that additional appropriate private and public steps can be 
evaluated and taken if warranted. Nevertheless, the expected practical impact of today’s popular 
approaches will be that efforts to evaluate patents, especially in the setting of technological 
standards, will be subject to increased reliance on the flexible discretion of legislators, regulators, 
and judges.96 The established economics and political science literatures on holdup suggest good 
reasons to think that the purported patent holdup risk is less severe than popular views suggest and 
one-sided solutions directed toward patent holdup may cause other, more serious problems, 
including a tendency to preferentially give more power to large, established companies at the 
expense of smaller companies, startups, and individual inventors.97 A potential consequence may 
be lower rates of commercializing innovation and higher prices as larger companies no longer feel 
as much pressure from an already reduced number of new market entrants. Moving in a more 
balanced approach may mitigate such risks and improve the experience of all players in the 
marketplace for patents, large and small. 
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